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As social scientists have probed deeper into the
employment problem in developing countries they
have found themselves redefining both the nature
of the problem and the scope of their analysis.
At the former level they have shifted their focus
from the shortage of 'modern sector' (i.e. enumer-
ated) employment opportunities to the shortage of
income-earning opportunities broadly defined; at
the latter level they have abandoned partial models
which treated the labour market in isolation from
the rest of the economy and political system in
favour of broader interdisciplinary models which
give a more realistic picture of the constraints
which attend measures to relieve the problem. But
usually these more general models have been
implicit rather than spelled out, and set in a
historical vacuum; as a consequence, some
concepts and relationships commonly used in
such models remain vague to the point where
policy recommendations based on them risk
having results opposite to those intended. In this
paper these points are argued with particular
reference to the report of the ILO employment
mission to Kenya (ILO 1972), and above all with
reference to the concept of the 'informal sector'
used in that report.'
An attempt has been made by Green (1975) to
uncover the analytical assumptions of the ILO
report's recommendations. In his version there
are eight key steps in the model, crudely repre-
sented in Figure 1
I. As a result of discrimination in the markets for,
in particular, land, labour and education in the
colonial period, giving rise to a structure of
privilege which has been taken over largely
intact by the post-colonial regime, income is
unequally distributed before and after taxation,
leading to a consumption pattern dominated
by high quality consumer goods, which must
either be imported or manufactured locally
by capital-intensive techniques;
1 The concept oí the 'informal sector' is due to Keith Hart
(1972(. Its elaboration in frmal economic models is, how-
ever, primarily due to John Weeks, a member of the ILO
mission to Kenya, whose successive reformulations of the
problem appear as Technical Appendix 22 of ILO (1972)
and Weeks (1975)
These local manufactures require the importa-
tion of foreign technology and (because tax
rates are so low and the propensity to consume
so high) foreign capital;
In the directly productive sector this is sought
via private foreign investment, and in the infra-
structural sector via public foreign aid with a
variety of political and economic concessions
made to increase the incentives to supply
knowledge and finance;
The resulting process of economic growth is
one which may generate a high rate of surplus
over social subsistence and a high growth rate
of GDP but has very high leakages into elite
consumption, foreign firms' profits on sales of
inputs and technology as well as in local sub-
sidiaries, and high cost/advanced technology
capital investment;
This process is self-reinforcing, as political
stability demands, in the perception of the
ruling elite, the constant creation of new
leakages out of that surplushigh wage
'Africanised' jobs in the modern sector, pieces
of land in the former scheduled (European)
areas, income opportunities in trade and trans-
port protected by licenceas foci for the
economic aspirations of educated people in
particular;
This stability is howevereven in the short
runhighly vulnerable to external shockse.g.
oil crises, declines in the prices of export
staplesand to misjudgments as to just how
many leakages of this sort have to be created to
sustain that stabilitymisjudgments, that is,
about what constitutes an acceptable division of
surplus among the elite;
lt is even more vulnerable in the long terni,
since what one may call the 'easy phase' of
employment creationthat made possible by
the straight transfer of settler land, Asian shops
and expatriate jobs to Africanswill soon end;
Hence it is only possible to avert a collapse of
the system either by a progressive increase in
foreign dependence or alternatively--and this is
the option recommended by the reportby
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redirecting resources into the so-called 'in-
formal' or 'urban marginal' sector where
labour intensity and dependence on the foreign
sector for inputs and for markets is lower. In
fact, the 'informal sector's' main market is
likely to be the 'informal sector' itselfthe
urban and rural working poor. There is thus a
real chance that a shift of government patronage
towardsor at any rate of government harass-
ment awayfrom the informal sector might
bring about a self-sustained growth process
within it, which would in turn substantially
alleviate internal income inequalities.2
It must be conceded at once that this sort of
approach uses a more sophisticated definition of
unemployment, and a more sophisticated model,
than a report on the unemployment problem in
Kenya a mere 12 years previously, which had
dismissed the entire unenumerated sector (esti-
mated by ILO (1972: 225) as encompassing, at
the end of the 1960s, some 125,000 people in
urban areas alone, or one-third of urban recorded
employment) in the characteristic moralising
accents of the tidiness-loving, colonial bureaucrat:
"Mention must be made of the problem
presented by the large number of Africans who
are seemingly unemployed, but who are
frequently in self-employment, often of a kind
which is perilously close to the borderline of
legality. In Nyanza (province) in particular
there are many itinerant hucksters who take
advantage, for example, of the large quantities
of produce being brought in by gullible
peasants to act as middlemen and so bedevil
the marketing of produce. They create, in effect,
an inverted black market by depriving the
producer of the full price to which he is
entitled and themselves obtaining a handsome
rake-off .....(emphases added) (Kenya
Government 1960:9).
indeed, a good deal of the ILO's energy in re-
lation to the informal sector went into arguing
that, contrary to this view, informal employment
was in fact productive. However, I wish to argue
that their picture of the informal sector (assump-
tion 8 of the implicit model set out on page 4)
falls short of adequacy as a basis for policy both
in its loose definition and in its assumptions that
2 The measured Gini coefficient (a meaure of income
inequality which varies on a scale from O for perfect equality
to 1 for perfect inequa1ity for Kenya in 1969 was 057, one
of the highest in the world; the comparable figure for Britain
in the same year was 0.29. For discussion see Mosley (1978)
Ch. 4.
informal sector incomes are lower, labour-
intensity higher and the product range less import-
dependent and more attuned to the needs of low
income consumers than in the formal sector.
Following on from this, 1 propose, in the light of
historical evidence, a tentative re-definition which
points the way to policy recommendations much
less ambitious than theirs.
First: what is the informal sector? lt is sympto-
matic that both the ILO report and the various
glosses on it that have appeared3 delimit it in
impressionistic fashion, on the implicit grounds
that, like the proverbial elephant, it may be
difficult to define but is instantly recognisable.
But is it? There are at least four working
definitions of 'informal' economic activity in
circulation, listed here in increasing order of
abstraction:
the accounting definition: those activities falling
outside the net of official and company register
statistics;
the definition according to size of firm: self-
employment, or employment in an establish-
ment with less than five employees;
the definition according to the pattern of indus-
trial relatiof15 practised in the firm: 'informality'
could here denote involvement in an establish-
ment not subject4 to, for example, minimum
wage legislation, unionisation, restrictions on
the use of child labour;
the definition according to the relationship of
the producing unit vis-à-vis the State: this, of
course, is an extension of (3), since it connotes
belonging to an establishment which, quite apart
from not being subjected to the protective legis-
lation described under (3), also benefits from
discriminatory measures designed to protect the
market position of particular firmsi.e. tariff
and quote protection, tax rebates, tax holidays,
low interest rates from parastatal credit organi-
sations, work permits for expatriates, licensing,
etc.
Until some sort of comprehensive statistical evi-
dence is available on the cross-correlation of
these attributes it will not be possible to do much
more than speculate on how far these four
attributes of informality co-vary. But this we lack
by definition: since the moment an establishment
comes to be sucked into the range of, at any rate,
the official statistical services, it disappears ipso
3 In particular, Weeks (1975) and Leys (1974, 1975).
4 Conceptually, we mean subject dr facto. In practice, we are
only going tu be able to measure subjection de Jure.
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Jacto from the informal sector under definition
(1). Yet there are obvious areas where the defini-
tions do not match: domestic service, much retail
trading and a good deal of small-farm agricultural
employment, for example, are included in the
formal sector under definition (I), but are equally
clearly in the informal sector under definition (4).
Given this, statements about the informal sector
en masse need to be based on similar definitions
of the informal sector if a coherent argument
is to be built up out of them. There is no evidence
that the ILO team have in fact done this: thus,
when they surmise that there are 100,000 to
125,000 Africans ¡n 'informal sector' employment
(ILO 1972: 225) they are clearly using definition
(1). and when they suggest that a redistribution
of government contracts in favour of the 'informal
sector' would improve the distribution of income
(ILO 1972:7) they are equally clearly using
definition (4). When they assert that it would
increase labour-intensity as well (ILO 1972:21-22)
moreover, they are in effect using a fifth defini-
tion, since the presumed labour-intensity of
'informal' operation is. inescapably, an expected
rather than an empirically ascertained attribute;
an attribute which was in fact found not to be
characteristic of Indian small industry (our defi-
nition (2) of 'informality') by Dhar and Lydall
(1961).
We seek to escape from this definitional quicksand
in two steps. Initially, we aim at consistency in
discussion by confining ourselves to definition (4)
which in its attempt to stratify all establishments
into an 'exploited' and a 'privileged' group seems
intuitively the most plausible, and then, in the
light of thIs discussion, we propose a new defini-
tion based on demand-categories.
Let us begin with the list of activities and pro-
ducts characteristic of the informal sector,
according to the ILO report (1972: 507 and Weeks
1975:4):
maize milling making of simple agri-
saw milling cultural tools
brickmaking transport (bus, pirate
brewing ('African' beer) taxi, donkey-cart)
furniture making retail trade
tailoring handicrafts
domestic service repairs
5 Fer an attempt to develop this fifth definition by presenting
the formal and informal sectors as alternative models of pro-
duction, see Davies, 1975.
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On the suggestion that a redistribution of demand
and of official patronage in favour of these
product-groups would help alleviate the 'spiral of
dependency' summarised on page 9 and Figure
I above, there seem to be three possible corn-
ru en t s
The first point has been made so eloquently
by Leys (1975, especially Chapter 8) that we will
do no more than summarise it here. This is that
the recommendations of the ILO mission had
very little political possibility of being imple-
mented: for they recommended, to a group whose
high standard of living depended on the con-
tin uance of certain monopoly privileges (guaran-
teed markets, restricted import permits, restricted
trade licences and so on) that they should abandon
those privileges: a suggestion put forward five
years earlier by an opposition party (the Kenya
Peoples Union) which had been outlawed and its
leading members locked up in late 1969. In
particular, the suggestion that the government
should turn from harassing to fostering the
'informal sector' and place orders with it was in
effect a request that:
"the sort of links which the monopolistic,
mainly foreign sector had not previously found
it profitable to have with small-scale African firms,
should now be added to the more fundamental
links which existed between foreign capital and
the government on the one hand, and the rest of
the economy on the other." (Leys 1975:268)
a policy which, even if it could be carried
through in delIance of the interests on which the
government depended, could only be accomplished
by switching business from privileged to under-
privileged firms amid an atmosphere of control-
i.e. by incorporating a new stratum into the ranks
of that privileged group of employers already
dependent on government patronage. In other
words, the mission's recommendations, to the
extent that they were not politically impracticable,
implied a mere extension of the structure of
privilege, not any real attack on inequality: a
formalisation, in fact, of a part of the informal
sector. As with the 'accounting' definition (1) of
the informal sector, so with this political defini-
tion, we come to perceive the sector's evanescence:
its tendency to vanish, like some shy animal, the
moment the government's gaze falls upon it. Once
this is grasped, "government aid to the informal
sector", as proposed by the ILO report, appears
as a contradiction in terms.
Secondly, a basic hypothesis underlying the ILO
model (assumption 8 of this paper) suggests
that if income were more equally distributed,
those who gained by the redistribution would
spend the increase on labour-intensive, informal
sector products and thus bring about an 'evolu-
tionary', local-deniand based increase in employ-
ment. This seems not to be consistent with the
empirical evidence. Table I offers an abstract
from the results of two recent budget surveys, one
carried out for three major towns in Kenya
(Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu) in 1968/69 and
the other, which is included as a check on these
results, carried out by Johnson in 1962 in the
tribal trust lands of former Southern Rhodesia. lt
classifies products according to their income-
elasticity of demand, i.e., the aggregate propen-
sity of the respondents to spend income increases
on particular products.
lt is immediately apparent that, in both countries,
there was a tendency for 'informal' products to
cluster in the left-hand columns of the table. In
other words, it appears that, given an increase in
income, Kenyan urban Africans (and Rhodesian
rural Africans) would spend a rather small, and
in some cases (maize flour, 'African' beer) even
a negative proportion of their income on'informal'
sector products, and would prefer to switch to
formal sector products--bottled beer for example.
That ¡s, there is little hope that any substantial
part of an income stimulus given to the informal
sector itself would spill back into it. The informal
sector, in other words, seems on the evidence of
Low (Under 05)
Maize flour * ()
Building materials * (R)
Chibuku (millet beer) * (R) (-)
Milk
Bread
Rice *
Sugar
Tea
Definition: The income elasticity of deniand for a
particular item is the extent to which expenditure
on that item increases across a sample of
households as their disposable income increases;
i.e. in the estimated regression equation
logE1 =a+blogY+clogN
where E1 =expenditure on good i, Y is household
income, N is household size (children under 16 get
a weight of one-half), b is the income elasticity
of demand for good i.
Income Elasticity of Demand
Medium (0.5 to 1.0)
Groundnuts (R)
Meat
Furniture *
Building materials * (K)
School fees
Bus fares * (R)
Rent
Clothing (K)
the available budget surveys to produce a large
proportion of goods which by the economist's
definition are 'inferior': i.e. not goods which are
in any sense shoddy, but goods so basic that only
a very small, possibly a negative, part of any
income increase can be spent on them. Hence
there is little hope that a once-for-all injection
into the informal sector would be in any sense
self-sustaining.
The third point is, in a sense, the converse of
the second. lt is that a number of those informal
sector outputs which do not fall prey to static
demand, from the point of view of the ILO team's
stated values become articles or services of elite
(or indeed foreign) consumption which from a
rec/istributive point of view it is irrational to
subsidise. This cannot be proved from the evi-
dence of the budgets of the poor and middle
income Africans so far surveyed, for the simple
reason that most poor and middle income
Africans do not consume them, but it is trans-
parently the case not only with a large number
of handicrafts, but with services of every sort
including the selling of newspapers, portering,
much panel-beating and repairing, and, pre-
eminently, domestic services.
Taking the second and third points together we
perceive the 'informal sector' not as a unity so
far as the destination of its outputs is concerned,
Table 1: Kenyan urban Africans(1968/69) and Rhodesia rural Africans (1962/63): Analysis of expenditure by income
elasticity groupings.
High (Over 1.0)
Paraffin (R)
Soap
Clothing (R)
Bottled beer
Other household goods
Bus fares * (K)
Remittances
Symbols: * product or service largely produced in
informal sector according to 1LO report
() negative income elasticity of demand
(R) Rhodesian Africans only
(K) Kenyan Africans only
Sources: Kenyan data only: Kenya Government
(1969). Figures for Nairobi only are used
Rhodesian data only: Johnson (1970)
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but as sharply bifurcated between a very low-
income goods sector with little dynamic potential
(but a potential refuge in time of hardship) and
a very high-income goods and services sector
with considerable growth, but very little redis-
tributive potential. This view gains considerable
support from the historical evidence, to which
we now turn.
Rural manufacturing and trade were pre-colonial
traditions in most African communities6 in which
the roots of the present-day informal sector
should be discerned7. While initially very hard-
hit by competition from mass-produced imports,
the former activities received a boost, it seems
from the decline in real incomes during the First
World War and the l930s as a consequence of
the substitution of cheap informal for relatively
dear formal products at this time. The desperate
nature of such expedients in the former period
is well illustrated by the Rhodesian Chief Native
Commissioner in his annual report for 1919:
"The high cost of all goods has, to a certain
extent induced the nations to attempt manu-
facturing several articles previously purchased
by them. In Lower Gwelo reserve hats are being
made from palm leaves, native-made pipes are
also replacing the imported article, and skins
are being more generally used in the place of
blankets."
(Southern Rhodesia Government 1920:4.)
A similar response in the latter period is docu-
mented by Newman (1975) for the case of Kenyan
petty commodity producers and traders; however,
the Rhodesian data for this period are much more
detailed, offering us a quantitative picture not
only of the time trend, but also of the cross-
sectional position in any given year. We quote
in extenso from a typical report, that for 1932:
"The following figures, which show details of the
natives in the Colony engaged in earning their
own livelihood in trades and businesses, have an
indicative value:
Baker I Mechanics 2
Barber 1 Midwives 4
Blacksmiths 9 Musicians 2
Bootblacks 5 Painters 33
Bricklayers 70 Photographers 2
Builders 394 Plasterers 3
Butcher 1 Charcoal burners 3
several such communities see
Carpenters 201 Rickshaw owners .. 32
Plumbers 34 Sieve makers . . . . 11
Clerks 41 Tailors 83
Cobblers 281 Taxi owners 23
Cycle repairers . 36 Eating house
Dairymen 4 keepers 27
Thatchers 36 Tennis court
Upholsterers . . . 29 maker 1
Watch menders . . 7 Fence erector . I
Market gardeners . 62 Transport riders . 22
General dealers . 7 Hat and basket
Hawkers 145 makers 21
Herbalists 20 Well sinkers . . . . 61
Kaross (leather Wire workers . . 34
bed-cover) makers 20 Wood sellers . .. . 22
Laundrymen 43
The total is 1.884, as compared with 1,586 last
year and 864 in 1930." (Southern Rhodesia
Government 1932: 7.)
As the Commissioner says, these figures only
have an indicative valuethey exclude not only
everything that a prudish administration could
class as illegal, e.g. prostitution and liquor
brewing, into which large numbers of Africans
were driven in periods of depression,8 but also
the informal sector's important role at the bottom
end of an urban housing market that was coming
under increasing pressure.9 However, they do
illustrate certain important trends and structural
features. The first of these is indicated by the
fact that the number of Africans recorded in
self-employment more than doubled in the two
years 1930-32, only the second period of falling
real wages in the colony's history. Once again
we see a part of the informal sector fulfilling
the same role as it had filled in the 1920/21
depression, i.e. that of economic asylum in time
of adversity. As the time series of Figure 2
indicate, this counter-cyclical tendency continued
into the late 1930s. Thereafter, however, it is
reversed. We interpret this in terms of a second
trend, namely, the tendency for the 'luxury goods
and services' part of the informal sector (as
identified by our income elasticity analysis) to
grow at the expense of the 'basic needs' part.
Symbolically, the number of 'tennis court makers'
had increased to over 20 by 1945, and the number
of those involved in food processing of various
types had declined.
8 This pressure is even mote evident during and immediately
after the Second World War, according to a couple of
samnie surveys of the conditions of urban Africans being
conducted at this time. For an excellent summary of their
findings see Gray 1960, part 2, Ch. 2.
9 On this see Clarke 1975, Ch. 8, and Mosley 1978, Ch. 4.
6 For a comparative account of
Gray and Birmingham (1971)
7 For a detailed account of an important part (capital-goods)
of the present-day Kenya mfback to pre-colonial Kikuyu ironworking, see King (1974).ormal sector, tracing its roots
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Figure 2: Time Series of Independent African
Businesses (i.e. Africans in self-employment in
the Reserves) against Average Modern Sector
Cash Wages, Southern Rhodesia, 1930-45.
Source. Mosley 1978, Ch. 4
It cannot be claimed that these historical frag-
ments prove any case one way or the other.
They do, however, offer modest support for a
view of the informal sector (in all senses of the
word), and of its developmental possibilities,
rather different from that envisaged by the ILO
report. In the first place we see the sector, not
as the homogenous huddle of poor artisans
depicted by the report, but as in essence two
sectors with sharply differentiated demand
prospects, the one catering for such a low-income
market as to experience its greatest stimuli in
times of declining real income, and hence capable
of self-sustained but strictly involutionary'0
growth; the other catering for a very high-income
market and hence, unlike the other, capable of
evolutionary growth at times of rising real
incomes, but dependent for that growth on
extraneous stimuli such as increases in foreign
or in elite consumption. In the second place,
stimuli to the informal sector, to the extent that
they arise from a purposive state action, have the
effect not of enriching it as such, but of changing
its statusof formalising it in both the statistical
sense and in the sense of its relation to the
State (see Appendix). This being so, the ideas,
implicit in the ELO's model, that the entire
informal sector, or even the major part of it,
could be expected to benefit from an income
increase among the low income groups, and that
the Slate could switch its patronage to the
informal sector without destroying its very
informality, need to be severely re-examined, if
not abandoned, and the lLO's proposed measures
themselves should be seen as having less radical
import for the pattern of dependency summarised
in Figure 1 than their originators expected. A
necessary prerequisite for such a re-examination
is a far more rigorous delimitation of the
'involutionary' and the 'dynamic' parts of the
informal sector than has here been attempted,
based on a thorough analysis of demand patterns;
this paper is intended as no more than an
impressionistic prelude, and stimulus, to such
analysis.
APPENDIX: MODELS OF INTER-SECTORAL
RELATIONS
Weeks (in ¡LO 1972, Technical Appendix 22, and
especially Weeks 1975) offers us a most valuable
framework in which to illustrate these points. He
writes the demand function for informal sector out-
puts as
X2 =a21X1 -i- a00X2 fa23X3 Ha04X4 +X2F
(ILO 1972, p. 507, or Weeks 1975, p. 5)
where X,, X,, X3, X4 are the outputs of peasant
agriculture, informal sector, formal sector and
government respectively, and a21, a02, a23, a04 are the
10 'involutionary' ref ers to the re-orientation of a static (Ordeclining) quantum of demand towards simpler product,.
Evolutionary' refers to the re-allocation of a rising real
income.
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respective propensities of those sectors to demand
the output of the informal sector (i.e. the value of
informal-sector output demanded per unit of each
sector's output). X2 is 'final' consumer demand for
informal-sector products.
The ILO's suggestions seem to be that
a reduction in inequality of income distribution
will boost X2F
any re-orientation of demand towards sectors
with a high propensity to demand informal-
sector outputs (high a2.'s) will improve the
distribution of income,
the government should as a deliberate policy
step raise a24 by changing its purchasing and
'standards' policy.
We can now see that:
effect (a) will be a weighted average of a small and
possibly negative effect in favour of that part of the
informal sector which has low income elasticity of
demand, and a strongly positive effect in favour of
the 'high income elasticity' part; the former part
will suffer from substitution of formal for informal
output. On account of this, the overall effect may
be exaggerated;
effect (b) is likely to be a short-run affair since the
sectors in question may well have a discontinuity
in their demand function: i.e. they have a high
propensity to demand informal-sector outputs at
low levels of sectoral income but switch their
purchases to formal sector enterprises when they
get richer. If this hypothesis is correct, measured
a2.'s would exaggerate sectors' likely future
propensity to purchase from the informal sector.
effect (c) is likely to be self-liquidating inasmuch as
the very fact of a24 being increased is likely to
mean, not an increase in informal sector output
(X2) but rather the co-option of the firms affected
into the protected 'formal' sector and thus a rise in
X3.
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